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A STUDY ON JURIDIFICATION. THE CASE OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS 
IN NINETEENTH CENTURY BELGIUM. 
 
by 
 
BRUNO DEBAENST (GENT), 
 
Introduction 
 
Juridification, described as ‘the process of increasing legal intervention in the employment 
relationship that can be seen in an expanding volume of legal regulation of employment and 
increasing recourse to legal process to resolve employment disputes’1 is an ambiguous legal concept 
that is, for the most part, only theoretically studied. This article will correct this problem by 
presenting legal historical research on juridification. The first part of the article will analyze the 
concept of juridification and develop a research model from which future research may be 
conducted. The second part of this article will apply this research model to nineteenth century 
Belgian industrial accidents2.  
 
The legal transitions of industrial accidents in nineteenth century Belgium 
 
Accidents have always and will always be a part of the workplace. In the past, industrial 
accidents were often considered merely a coincidence of ‘bad luck’ with no compensation for the 
worker, which greatly contrasts with the contemporary western world. Nowadays social security 
accommodates workers with well-organized systems to deal with the impending damage caused by 
industrial accidents. The origin of these systems can be found in the nineteenth century with the first 
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 In this article I will concentrate on the Belgian situation. A comparison of this Belgian situation with other 
European countries will be the object of another article. 
statutes on industrial accident insurance. These statutes were the result of an interesting transitional 
process3.  
 
For France, the historian, lawyer and philosopher François Ewald studied this transitional 
process in his famous study ‘L’Etat providence’4. His study starts at the end of the eighteenth century 
and describes the transition from a liberal to a ‘social’ French society, where the changing legal 
points of views were crucial. Industrial accidents were no longer perceived as insignificant accidents, 
but events that caused damage that had to be reconciled through insurance. Looked at from a legal 
historian’s point of view, one can ask the question if this transitional process can be seen as a process 
of juridification. 
 
Juridification has already been used to describe the general development of the laboring and 
industrial world5. More in particular, juridification was used to characterize the transition from a 
contemplative state to an active one, the so-called ‘Interventionsstaat’ and the genesis of the 
contemporary social security state6. It started with smaller state interventions that limited excesses 
of specific aspects such as women or child labor or dangerous labor conditions in certain branches of 
industry7. These limited interferences led to new interventions and the development of proper 
dynamics8. According to Simitis, labor law constitutes the classic paradigm of juridification, which 
makes this branch of law the perfect study on juridification9. Although industrial accidents fit 
perfectly within this picture, surprisingly, the legal transitional process of industrial accidents has yet 
to be studied from a perspective of juridification10. 
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 I refer to Habermas who describes these transitions as the fourth and final big stage of the legal development. 
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democratic constitutional state. J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Frankfurt am Main 1981, 
II, p. 525.  
6
 M. Stolleis, Die Entstehung des Interventionsstaates und das öffentliche Recht, in: M. Stolleis, Konstitution 
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 This does not mean that some authors have not yet mentioned the concept of juridification in the context of 
industrial accidents, but this was only marginal. Rob Schwitters for example spoke about a juridification of the 
aid relationships (‘hulprelaties’) in his PhD about the genesis of the industrial accident statute in the Netherlands. 
R. Schwitters, De risico’s van de arbeid. Het ontstaan van de Ongevallenwet 1901 in sociologisch perspectief, 
Groningen 1991. Other authors used the concept of juridification in the larger framework of the employment 
 There are two explanations for this gap. Firstly, the transitional process of industrial 
accidents in the nineteenth century is a gigantic field. One can concentrate on one country or draw 
comparisons between multiple countries11. One can also choose between different approaches, such 
as sociological12, economic13, political14, historical15 or legal16. Finally, different topics can be studied, 
such as the legislative process17, the social politics18, the compensation mechanisms19 or the genesis 
of the social welfare state20. So, looking at this transitional process from the point of view of 
juridification is just one of many possibilities. 
 
Secondly, juridification as a concept is very complex and not easily applied to legal historical 
research. In the past, it has mainly been discussed theoretically. For example, in the 1980’s it was a 
popular topic in academia because it was used as a theoretical concept to better understand the 
problem of overregulation21. But juridification as a concept is much more complex. It has many 
different layers and is not easily defined22. Nevertheless, there is an explicit necessity to define, or 
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contrat de travail et la problématique de l’entreprise avant 1914, Revue interdisciplinaire d’études juridiques, 
15 (1985), p. 41-88. Lacking however is a study using the theoretical concept of juridification to understand the 
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security and compensation in industrialising Europe: The case of Britain, Germany and Italy, 1870-1925, 
Annual Review of Law and Ethics, 17 (2009), p. 237-258. Julia Moses has also written a PhD on this topic, 
which at this moment is not yet published.  
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Rechtsentwicklung am Beispiel des deutschen Unfallschadensrecht im 19. Jahrhundert, Tübingen 2001. 
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 J. Deferme, Uit de ketens van de vrijheid. Het debat over de sociale politiek in België. 1886-1914, Leuven 
2007. 
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 It would take us too far to list all historical works discussing industrial accidents in the nineteenth century. As 
an example, I refer to the series ‘Histoire des accidents du travail’ that has been published between 1975 en 1985 
in Nantes. Recently there was also a workgroup active on the topic ‘Histoire(s) de la santé au travail’, with a 
conference in 2008 in Le Creusot.  
16
 One example is a study about the shifts in liability law. S. Klosse and T. Hartlief (ed.), Shifts in compensation 
work-related injuries and diseases, Vienna 2007. 
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 W. De Vries, De totstandkoming van de Ongevallenwet 1901: De invloed van werkgevers en werknemers op 
de eerste sociale verzekeringswet in Nederland, Deventer 1970. 
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Oxford 1983. 
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 J.F. Witt, The accidental republic: crippled workingmen, destitute widows, and the remaking of American law, 
Cambridge 2004. 
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Cambridge 2007. 
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 R. Voigt (ed.), Verrechtlichung. Analysen zu Funktion und Wirkung von Parlamentarisierung, 
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 ‘This (defining) is not a straightforward task, since the concept of juridification is not precise and different 
writers have developed their own variations on the meaning of the term.’ M. Partington, The juridification of 
rather conceptualize, juridification23. ‘What is needed is a conceptualisation that is complex enough 
to grasp the different meanings of the term and still simple enough to work as an inter-subjective 
standard’24. This statement comes from two Norwegian researchers, who distinguished five different 
dimensions of juridification applied upon European law25. Although it is not possible nor desirable to 
apply their approach to the transitional process of juridification of industrial accidents, it shows the 
necessity to differentiate between concepts of juridification26. 
 
Because of the magnitude of the study and the complexity of the juridification concept, the 
development of a research model is necessary. Within this research model, I first must draw a 
horizontal differentiation. Following Rüdiger Voigt, I will make a triple distinction following the ‘trias 
politicas’27. The first section will be the juridification through parliament (‘Vergesetzlichung’ or 
‘Parlementarisierung’), with, for example, the first social legislation. The second will be the 
juridification through administrative organs (‘Bürokratisierung’), with, for example, the rise of the 
labor inspection. The third will be the juridification through case law (‘Justizialisierung’)28. These 
three different ‘fields of juridification’ on the horizontal level are characterized by a proper evolution 
following its own dynamics and by an influence from other ‘fields of juridification’. In this article I 
term the three horizontal fields as ‘semi-autonomous social fields’, inspired by legal anthropology. In 
1973, Sally Falk Moore introduced this concept, defining it as29:  
 
The semi-autonomous social field has rule-making capacities, and the means to induce or coerce 
compliance; but it is simultaneously set in a larger social matrix which can, and does, affect and invade 
it, sometimes at the invitation of persons inside it, sometimes at its own instance. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Social Welfare in Britain, in: G. Teubner (ed.), Juridification of social spheres. A comparative analysis in the 
areas of labor, corporate, antitrust and social welfare law, Berlin 1987, p. 420. 
23
 ‘A precise use of terms and definitions is necessary, especially in the case of juridification, not just for the sake 
of terminological clarity but, as already indicated, to create a working framework in which to examine the 
complex phenomenon of juridification.’ G. Teubner (ed.), Juridification of social spheres. A comparative 
analysis in the areas of labor, corporate, antitrust and social welfare law, Berlin 1987, p. 6. 
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 L. Blichner and A. Molander, Mapping juridification, European Law Journal, 14 (2008), p. 37. 
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 Their first dimension is ‘constitutive juridification’. The second dimension is the process by which an activity 
becomes subjected to legal regulation or more detailed legal regulation (quantitative and qualitative 
differentiation). Next comes the dimension of the use of law for conflict resolution, which they divide between 
judicial, legal and lay conflict solving. The fourth dimension is the increase of power of the judiciary 
(judicialisation). The fifth and last dimension is juridification as legal framing, ‘the increased tendency to 
understand self and others, and the relationship between self and others, in light of a common legal order.’ 
26
The dimension of constitutive juridification for example cannot directly be applied upon industrial accidents.  
27
 R. Voigt (ed.), Verrechtlichung. (supra, n. 21), p. 18-23. 
28
 In my Ph.D. study, I refined this by adding jurisprudence (with the development of new theories and insights) 
and the world of labor itself (with the production of norms such as the labor contract or workhouse regulations), 
although it has to be added that these two are less important in the general process of juridification. That is why I 
will not discuss them here, due to the limited scope of this article. Jurisprudence here will be discussed as an 
annex of case law. B. Debaenst, Een proces van bloed, zweet en tranen. Juridisering van arbeidsongevallen in 
de negentiende eeuw in België, Brussels 2011.  
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 S. Falk Moore, Law and social change: the semi-autonomous social field as an appropriate subject of study, 
Law & Society Review, 8 (1973), p. 720. 
Although Falk Moore used this concept in a different context, ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ 
can be very useful to demonstrate the simultaneous autonomy and interdependency of the three 
horizontal fields of juridification. For example, Maus wrote that the introduction of new statutes did 
not lead to the inactivity of the administration and judiciary, but rather to the development of new 
administrative norms and case law30. These five ‘fields of juridification’ also have to be put in a 
general and specific context. For example, the evolutions in parliament depend on the policital 
context, case law and jurisprudence, which are all determinated by legal context. Therefore, all of 
them must be situated in their respective historical context.  
 
I must now draw a vertical differentiation. The lowest level, which has the least to do with 
the dynamics of juridification, is the individual case. Every accident happens within a specific context 
and is the result of specific events. Although it can be very interesting to study an individual case, it is 
not very enlightening for the process of juridification, as it is a ‘static’ event31. More interesting is the 
local level, where a sequence of industrial accidents can be studied within one judicial district, one 
factory or one economic sector over a longer period of time. However, the most important level is 
the national level, as the national legal culture, the parliamentary activities and the national 
administration are situated here. Last is the international level, with for example the international 
conferences regarding industrial accidents that began to be organized in 1889. In this article I will 
only discuss the juridification of industrial accidents on the national Belgian level.  
 
Juridification of industrial accidents in Belgium 
 
The 1843 Mareska and Heyman survey 
 
I will start with a survey conducted by Mareska and Heyman between 1843 and 184532. In 
this period, these two physicians investigated the living and working conditions of the workers in 
Ghent, which was at that time a huge center of mechanized textile industry. In order to conduct their 
research, Mareska and Heyman visited the textile factories and talked with workers and factory 
owners. They were not only staggered by the poor working conditions33, but also by the large 
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 I. Maus, Rechtstheorie und Politische Theorie im Industriekapitalismus, Munich 1986, p. 277. 
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 A specific industrial accident can be interesting for the history of juridification, when it constituted an 
important changing point in the evolution of case law for example. I will discuss some of these cases further.  
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 J. Mareska and J. Heyman, Enquête sur le travail et la condition physique et morale des ouvriers employés 
dans les manufactures de coton, à Gand, Ghent 1845. This study was also published in the Annales et Bulletin 
de la Société de médecine de Gand.  
33
 Cleaning cotton for example created a lot of dust, which made it hard to breathe. In other stages of the 
production process, workers had to work in unbearable temperatures of 37-38°. Weaving was deafening because 
of the incessant rattling of the looms. In the bleaching rooms there was a high level of humidity. But most 
importantly, the workers had to work long days, performing repetitive, mind numbing tasks, which led to all kind 
of deformations.  
number of accidents that occurred34. Most dangerous were the moving mechanics that could 
severely maim, mutilate, or kill workers35. Out of 1.000 workers, Mareska and Heyman registered no 
less than 194 workers who suffered injuries because of the dangerous machinery36. This staggering 
statistic did not include all the workers who were killed or disabled due to such an accident37.  
 
When looking for the causes of these accidents, the factory owners blamed the workers, who 
were often imprudent or even reckless while performing their daily tasks. The physicians agreed: 
living amid the daily dangers caused a certain familiarity. The workers also had a number of bad 
habits, such as wearing too loose clothing, cleaning active machinery or replacing moving belts38. In 
general, the workers were very detached to industrial accidents, which were considered to be 
‘malheurs’. Instead of taking effective preventive measures, workers trusted upon their faith to 
prevent bad luck happening to them39.  
 
The workers, however, were not the only ones to blame. Mareska and Heyman also pointed 
at the factory owners who knew the dangers and the habits of the workers, but failed to take the 
necessary preventive measures. In a number of factories, preventive measures were implemented 
with great success40, but in most cases, factory owners did nothing to prevent accidents. When an 
industrial accident occurred, the poor victim was carried to the hospital or to his family and replaced 
by a new worker…  
 
Not surprisingly, in their conclusions, Mareska and Heyman favored labor inspection and 
safety regulation in order to prevent these horrific accidents from happening41. Their survey was part 
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 Mareska and Heyman gave a description of all kind of accidents in the subsequent stages of the production 
process. They mentioned for example accidents with flywheels. One day, when they were interrogating workers, 
the news came that such an accident had occurred and killed a young girl in a nearby factory. In another factory 
they have met a woman who had survived such an accident. J. Mareska and J. Heyman, Enquête (supra, n. 32), 
p. 21-22. 
35
 Workers could be caught by these moving parts or get entangled with their clothes. Because of the speed and 
force of this powerful machinery, such an unpleasant encounter could lead to a quick death, or in the best case, a 
serious mutilation.  
36
 In most of the cases (113) the workers had only suffered minor injuries, but in 57 cases the workers had 
permanent injuries and in 24 cases one could even speak from real deformations.  
37
 Mareska and Heyman based their numbers upon their interviews with the workers in the factories.  
38
 J. Mareska and J. Heyman, Enquête (supra, n. 32), p. 202. 
39
 Mareska and Heyman gave the example of a holy Mass being celebrated to ask for Divine intervention in 
order to stop a series of industrial accidents in a certain factory. Ironically, the next day, the one person who had 
done all the efforts to organize the Mass became himself victim of an industrial accident: while incautiously 
replacing a moving belt, his left thumb was ripped off.  
40
 These preventive measures included positioning the dangerous machines in a way that the workers did not 
have to walk next to the moving parts or covering parts with protective shields. J. Mareska and J. Heyman, 
Enquête (supra, n. 32), p. 24. 
41
 The regulation had to contain provisions towards the obligatory coverage of moving parts, a general defense to 
clean machines during labor time and a minimum surface of the rooms to allow the workers to move without 
danger. In order to supervise these regulations, an efficient inspection was necessary. According to the two 
physicians, one inspector would be sufficient to overview the mechanic textile industry. J. Mareska and J. 
Heyman, Enquête (supra, n. 32), p. 253-256. 
of a bigger investigation on child labor and in the final report of the parliamentary commission in 
1848 their safety regulation recommendations were adopted. Charles Rogier, the Minister of the 
Interior, sent a report to the commercial chambers for advice42. Unfortunately, the chiefs of industry 
showed a fierce opposition to the proposals43, which they described as an attack upon the rights and 
interests of industry and a disastrous disruption to the organization of industrial labor44. Basically, 
they defended the old liberal dogma of state non-intervention in the industrial world45. As a result, 
Rogier wisely decided not to bring the report to the parliament46. 
 
 The administrative evolutions after 1848 
 
Instead, Rogier decided to take the administrative route. On the 12 November 1859, King 
Leopold I signed the Royal Decree ‘relatif à la police des établissements dangereux, insalubres ou 
incommodes’47. This Decree reformed earlier regulation of the French48 and Dutch49 periods, 
concerning the health and safety regulations of dangerous, unhealthy or polluting factories. 
Interestingly enough, the Decree for the first time explicitly mentioned labor safety50. Following the 
Decree, Rogier sent a number of clarifying instructions to the governors, which implored the 
administration to ensure that all possible preventive measures were taken. After all, the workers 
themselves could not complain about poor labor conditions without risk of losing their jobs. Thus, 
the administration had to fulfill the role of guardian (‘les fonctions de tuteur’) over the workers and 
ensure that all necessary protective measures were taken51. In 1851, Rogier specified which 
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 Charles Rogier (1800-1885) was a liberal politician.  
43
 In 1859, Charles Rogier testified: ‘Le projet de loi, proposé par cette commission, n’a pas abouti. Soumis à 
l’avis des Chambres de commerce et des principaux industriels du pays, il n’a pas été bien accueilli dans son 
ensemble par la majorité des collèges et des hommes compétents consultés. On a trouvé en général que ce projet 
de loi ne tenait pas assez compte des nécessités du travail industriel, que les dispositions en étaient conçues à un 
point de vue trop abstrait, et qu’il compliquait la solution de la question principale de beaucoup d’accessoires, 
étrangers à l’objet essentiel à régler, à savoir l’admission et le travail des enfants et des femmes dans les 
manufactures.’ Letter dd. 20 juli 1859 from Charles Rogier to the governors, in: Bulletin du Conseil supérieure 
de l’industrie et du commerce (1862), p. 219 ; Parliamentary pieces Chamber (1859-60), p. 250. 
44
 Other ‘arguments’ were: the Belgian industry would not be able to withstand competition with abroad, the 
factory owners would be treated as criminals, valuable secrets would be revealed, etc.  
45
 A.F. La Berge, Mission and method. The early nineteenth-century French public health movement, Cambridge 
1992, p. 149. 
46
 This would have had no effect, as the members of parliament shared the same opinions as the members of the 
commercial chambers. 
47
 Royal Decree 12 November 1849 ‘relatif à la police des établissements dangereux, insalubres ou 
incommodes’, Moniteur belge (13 November 1849), Pasinomie, III, 19 (1849), p. 472-480. 
48
 Decree 15 October 1810 ‘concernant les manufactures qui répandent une odeur insalubre ou incommodes’, 
Pasinomie, I, 15, p. 179-184. Before 1810, the safety and health regulation about the industrial factories was 
issued by the local authorities. J.-L. Halpérin, Histoire du droit privé depuis 1804, Paris 1996, p. 138. 
49
 Royal Decree 31 January 1824 ‘rakende de vergunning ter oprigting van sommige fabrieken en trafieken’, 
Staatsblad (20 februari 1824), Pasinomie, II, 7, p. 470-473. 
50
 ‘Elle fera connaître, de plus, les mesures qu’on se propose de prendre pour empêcher ou diminuer les 
inconvénients de l’établissement, tant pour les voisins que dans l’intérêt des ouvriers’. Article 2 Royal Decree 12 
November 1849 ‘relatif à la police des établissements dangereux, insalubres ou incommodes’, Moniteur belge 
(13 November 1849), Pasinomie, III, 19 (1849), p. 472-480. 
51
 Letter of 27 September 1850 ‘instruction générale pour l’exécution des arrêtés royaux du 12 novembre 1849 et 
du 15 avril 1850’, Pasinomie, III, 20 (1850), p. 285-292. 
measures had to be introduced52. As it turned out, they were identical to the safety 
recommendations of the child labor commission of 184853, which shows the policy of minister Rogier: 
rather than suffering a guaranteed defeat in an unwilling parliament, he tried to introduce the safety 
measures by updating an existing regulation. 
 
At first sight this seemed a good idea, but the plan was flawed. Firstly, the impact of the new 
safety regulation was very limited. It only applied to new factories. Existing factories were not 
affected. There was also a problem with the control over safety measures: this task was confined to 
the local police, which was just not up to it54. But perhaps the biggest problem was the unstable basis 
for safety regulation. Whereas in the 1850’s Charles Rogier and his successors tried to impose and 
improve safety regulations55, in the next decade everything changed with Alphonse 
Vandenpeerboom in 1861. He was a notorious non-interventionist and in 1863, he issued a new 
Royal Decree, by which he turned back the regulatory clock56. With this Decree, he ‘simplified’ the 
administrative procedure to establish new industrial plants. Basically, the ‘long and costly’ procedure 
on the national level was abolished and transferred to the provincial and local level.  
 
Looked at from the perspective of juridification, I have to conclude that the parliamentary 
plan to introduce safety regulations in the world of industry was firmly blocked because of the 
dominant liberal ideology of non-interventionism (no ‘Parlementarisierung’). The Minister of the 
Interior tried to circumvent this obstacle by adjusting a previous regulation (‘Bürokratisierung’). At 
first sight, this seemed successful, but a closer look learns that these efforts were marginal and only 
brief. 
 
 The first industrial accident trials 
 
For the next stage in the history of juridification of industrial accidents in Belgium, one has to 
look at the judiciary (‘Justizialisierung’) because at the end of the 1860’s the first cases on industrial 
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 Letter 5 March 1851 ‘Mesures de précaution à prendre, dans certaines fabriques, en faveur des ouvriers qui y 
sont employés’, J. Vilain, Traité théorique et pratique de la police des établissements dangereux, insalubres ou 
incommodes, Brussels 1857, p. 554-556. 
53
 For example: the moving parts of the machinery had to be covered with protective shields, it had to be 
forbidden to remove moving belts, etc.  
54
 In 1857 Vilain wrote that the police was just not apt for the job, because they were not experienced. He 
proposed the introduction of a special inspection. J. Vilain, Traité (supra, n.52), p. 333-334 ; This opinion was 
confirmed in 1895 by labor inspector De Camps, who said that had to be admitted that the local police only 
rarely did its job. Rapports annuels de l’inspection du travail, 2 (1896), Part II, p. 114-115. 
55
 After Charles Rogier, ministers of the interior Piercot and De Decker also tried to improve the quality of the 
safety measures in the industry: they also wrote letters to the governors reminding them of the importance of a 
good safety supervision of industry. The liberal Ferdinand Piercot was minister from 1852 till 1855 and the 
catholic Pieter De Decker from 1855 till 1857. From 1857 till 1861, Charles Rogier was again minister of 
interior affairs.  
56
 Royal Decree 29 January 1863 ‘contenant révision et simplification des dispositions concernant la police des 
établissements dangereux et insalubres’, Moniteur belge (30 January 1863), Pasinomie, III, 33 (1863), p. 45-54. 
accidents appeared in court, which can be separated into three industrial categories: steam engines, 
mines, and railroads. It is no coincidence that these were the first to appear and there are a number 
of explanations as to why these specific industrial accidents were the first to be ‘juridified’. 
 
The three mentioned categories of accidents all belonged to highly technological, capital 
intensive sectors. The installation of a steam engine with all the corresponding machinery, the 
construction of a fully equipped mine or the purchase of locomotives and wagons were all very 
expensive. In addition, each category shared a similar element of danger. Steam boilers could 
explode and destroy whole factories in a blink of an eye. Mines could collapse, fill with water, catch 
fire or explode because of the feared mining gas. And the railroads were also a continuous source of 
danger, with colliding or derailing trains, exploding engines, etc. Aside from the financial losses, many 
people lost their lives in these catastrophes.  
 
The combination of the danger and the magnitude of events explain why these three sectors 
were already subjected to state regulation and inspection (‘Bürokratisierung’) from an early date. 
The safety regulation in the mines dated back to the French period, with the introduction of the 
mining inspection in 181057. The state had to supervise the public safety, maintenances of the pits, 
the solidity of the underground and the safety of the miners and the edifices on the surface58. Two 
mining disasters in Liege in 1812 illuminated the need for a comprehensive safety regulation to 
prevent future mining accidents59. The answer to these tragedies was the Imperial Decree of 3 
January 1813 ‘contenant des dispositions relatives à l’exploitation des mines’60. This Decree provided 
foundations for safety regulations in the mines61. Regulations on the steam engine also began in the 
French period62. The railroad regulation appeared later, which is only logical, as the first railroads did 
not appear in Belgium until the 1830’s63. 
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Pasinomie, I, 15, p. 179-184.  
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 The origins of the railroad regulation are found in the Act of 12 April 1835 concernant les péages et les 
règlements de police sur les chemins de fer, Moniteur belge (17 April 1835), Pasinomie, III, 5 (1835), p. 187-
188. 
During the nineteenth century, these early regulations evolved gradually, following 
technological developments, which are exemplified by steam engine regulations. The first ‘Belgian’ 
regulation was the Royal Decree of 183964. This Decree was regularly updated in the course of the 
nineteenth century, in 1846, 1853, 1864, and 188465. On the one hand, some prescriptions were 
repeated, such as the requirement to report a fatal steam engine accident to the public prosecutor66. 
On the other hand, new technical requirements were added, such as new safety prescriptions, which 
was no luxury. Due to the steady rise in the quantity of steam engines – from 2.282 in 1850 to 22.961 
in 1900 – the respective number of steam engine accidents rose proportionately in the third quarter 
of the nineteenth century67.  
 
A famous Belgian example concerns the mechanic textile factory ‘Société linière’ in Saint 
Gilles near Brussels68. On 14 April 1870, a boiler exploded. Instantaneously the factory was ravaged. 
Five people were killed instantly and seven soon afterwards. The administrative investigation 
revealed that the accident was caused by the poor quality of the iron plates69. Interesting enough, a 
number of relatives went to court to claim damages for the loss of their loved ones. On 31 May 1871 
the civil tribunal of Brussels condemned the ‘Société linière’ ¸ requiring them to pay damages70. 
This judgment was confirmed by the Court of Appeal of Brussels on 16 April 187271. Meanwhile, 
disaster struck again. On 26 March 1872, less than two years after the first incident, another boiler 
exploded, with even more devastating consequences: twelve workers were killed on the spot. This 
time, the criminal investigation led to the conviction of the factory director by the correctional 
tribunal of Brussels on 4 March 1874, confirmed by the Court of Appeal of Brussels on 4 February 
187572. In the slipstream of these procedures, a number of relatives again succeeded in obtaining 
compensation for their losses73.  
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 These cases illustrate steam engine, mining or railroad disasters in nineteenth century 
Belgium. The magnitude of these events caused much distress and alarmed not only public opinion, 
but also the judicial and administrative forums, which gained recognition during the event. The 
existing steam engine regulations required the competent administration to draw a report describing 
the accident, the suspected causes and the persons who were to be held liable74. This report was 
then sent to the public prosecutor, who decided rather or not to prosecute, then added this report to 
the criminal file. In a number of cases, people were prosecuted and condemned because of their role 
in the fatal disasters. Also, from the 1870’s on, the victims of such disasters or their relatives 
addressed themselves to the judiciary in order to be compensated for their losses75. According to 
Belgian liability law, they had to prove that the employer made a mistake that caused the accident76. 
In normal circumstances, this proof was very hard to deliver, but thanks to the preceding criminal 
and administrative procedures, in a number of cases, such as the disaster of the Société linière, they 
succeeded77.  
 
It is important to note that contemporaries did not immediately look at these procedures as 
‘industrial accident procedures’. They saw them as ‘liability procedures’, in accords with the legal 
ground, or ‘mining or railroad accident procedures’ of the economic sector78. Gradually, as more 
judgments were published, the separate ‘industrial accident procedures’ started link with each other, 
through cross-references. One example can illustrate this. In a railroad accident case from 1872, the 
Belgian State used the defense that it could not be held liable for the damages caused by one of its 
employees, if the victim was an employee himself79. To strengthen the state’s argument, she referred 
to mining accidents80. In the accompanying note, the authors referred to the judgment of the civil 
tribunal of Brussels in the already mentioned steam accident case of the Société Linière81. In other 
words, in this specific case, the three mentioned categories (railroad, mining and steam engine 
accidents) were linked to each other. Other interesting phenomena are referenced in foreign case 
                                                          
74
 Article 51 Royal Decree 1864. See above. 
75
 These claimed compensations concerned mainly the loss of future earnings, but also other compensations were 
asked (for example moral damages). For an overview, I refer to my article: B. DEBAENST, l’Evaluation 
judiciaire des dommages-intérêts des accidents du travail à la fin du XIXe siècle en Belgique : le cas de Mons, 
in : J. Horeau-Dodinau, G. Metairie et P. Texier (ed.), La victime. II. Réparation du dommage, Limoges 2009, p. 
415-437. 
76
 The articles 1382-1386 Civil Code. 
77
 In the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Brussels in the case of the Société linière, one can read: ‘Attendu 
que, d’après l’administration des points et chaussées, l’accident doit être attribute à la qualité défectueuse de la 
tôle du fond bombé de la chaudière qui a été arrachée (ainsi que l’a publié le Moniteur du 2 mars 1871)’. So, this 
Court based itself on the administrative report that had been published. Court of Appeal Brussels, 16 April 1872, 
La Belgique Judiciaire, 30 (1872), p. 1314. 
78
 In the volume of the Pandectes Belges (a juridical encyclopedia) of 1879, one finds references to ‘accident’, 
‘accident de chemin de fer’ and ‘accident dans les mines’, but not to ‘accident du travail’. In 1921, part 113 
contained a lemma ‘travail (accident du).  
79
 Civil tribunal Liege, 15 June 1872, La Belgique Judiciaire, 31 (1873), p. 63. 
80
 ‘Il faudrait aller jusqu’à dire que, par exemple, dans les accidents de houillères, où périssent parfois un nombre 
considérable d’ouvriers, l’exploitant serait responsable vis-à-vis de toutes les familles de ces ouvriers si 
l’accident était dû à l’imprudence de l’une d’eux.’  
81
 This case was also mentioned in the discussion of other judgments, such as: Court of Appeal Brussels 21 
January 1873, La Belgique Judiciaire, 31 (1873), p. 454 and Civil Tribunal Antwerp, 9 April 1874, La Belgique 
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law and jurisprudence. Already in 1864, French cases concerning industrial accidents were being 
published in La Belgique Judiciaire82 and authors discussing Belgian cases often referred to French 
case law from Sirey and Dalloz83. This was not that surprising, as Belgium at that time was a 
backwards ‘legal colony’ of France84. After all, in France, the Cour de Cassation already decided in 
1841 that an employee could start a procedure against his employer to be compensated for 
damages85. 
 
The early industrial accident cases published in Belgian case law established precedence, and, 
more importantly, the early industrial accident cases broke some juridical barriers. On 7 May 1869 
for example, the highest Court, the Cour de Cassation, rendered an important decision in the case of 
Lammertyn, a train driver86. The defendant, the Belgian State, claimed that his relatives could not sue 
his employer. After all, when Lammertyn started working for the Belgian state railroads, he accepted 
all the risks of the job87. In return, he received his wage and other benefits, like retirement rights88. 
The judges rejected this argument. They determined that the labor relation was nothing more than 
the simple exchange of wages for work with labor as a commodity89. The contractual relationship did 
not have an influence upon possible claims based on extra-contractual liability law90. With this 
decision, the Belgian Cour de Cassation acknowledged the possibility for an employee to start a 
procedure against his employer, based upon extra-contractual liability law. 
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In other countries, it was not the judiciary, but the legislator who tore down certain juridical 
obstacles. In the common law countries for example, it was very hard for an employee to start a 
procedure against his employer because of the so-called ‘Unholy Trinity’91. First, the fellow servant 
rule stated that it was impossible for an employee to sue his employer for another employee’s 
mistakes. Another obstacle was the assumption of risk, which could be compared with the discussion 
in the above mentioned Belgian case92. The third ‘unholy’ rule was the rule of contributory 
negligence, which blamed the imprudence of the victim. The 1880 Employer’s Liability Act softened 
the effects of these juridical obstacles in England93. In Germany, a similar act was voted in 1871, the 
Reichshaftpflichtgesetz94. Before, the workers were hindered by very strict procedural rules, which 
made it almost impossible to deliver necessary proof to obtain compensation for personal 
damages95. The Reichshaftpflichtgesetz expanded the liability of employers in a number of dangerous 
sectors, which made it easier on paper for the employees to litigate. In reality, however, it remained 
very difficult for employees to receive compensations from their employers because of the harsh 
attitude of many judges and the difficulty in finding and presenting evidence96. 
 
Belgian workers faced the same problem. Although it became possible for a victim of an 
industrial accident or his relatives to go to court to claim damages from his or her employer, this was 
only successful in a few cases. After all, according to Belgian liability law, the plaintiffs had to prove 
that the employer – or one of his employees – made a mistake that caused the accident97. However, 
in many cases it was impossible to deliver this proof because the accident was caused by a mistake of 
the victim himself98 or by a so-called ‘Act of God’99. Even if the employer or one of his employees was 
to blame for the accident, it remained very difficult to deliver proof thereof in court. In many cases, 
the employer destroyed incriminating evidence and it was also difficult to find witnesses willing to 
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testify against their employer. In all, only a small percentage of industrial accident procedures ended 
well for the plaintiffs. 
 
The 1884 theory of Charles-Xavier Sainctelette  
  
This problem was acknowledged by Charles-Xavier Sainctelette100. As a lawyer practicing in 
the coal mining district of Mons, he came across many victims of industrial accidents, who had tried 
the judicial route, but drastically failed to obtain compensation for their losses. Moreover, between 
1878 and 1882, Sainctelette was the minister responsible for the mining, railroad and steam engine 
administrations, so he was well acquainted with the industrial accident problem (and trials) in these 
sectors. In 1884, he wrote a book, ‘De la responsabilité et de la garantie’, containing a new legal 
theory101.  
 
According to Sainctelette, there were two kinds of obligations: obligations originating from a 
contract and obligations originating from law102. In the former, one contract party had to ‘guarantee’ 
that damages caused to the other contract party in the execution of the contract would be paid103. In 
the latter, the damaging party had to pay for these damages based on traditional extra-contractual 
liability law104. Unfortunately, in the past the legislator was not always careful with this terminology, 
which led to confusion in jurisprudence and case law105. After a comprehensive overview of his 
theory, Sainctelette applied it to a number of contracts, such as the contract of transport of goods, 
the contract of transport of passengers and, important for this story, the labor contract. If a worker 
became victim to an industrial accident, the employer had a contractual obligation to pay the 
damages (‘guarantee’), unless he could prove that he had done everything to prevent the accident 
from happening. This shift in the burden of proof was of course beneficial to the workers.  
 
Underlying his theory was a modern view of the labor contract. Sainctelette did not start 
from the traditional juridical view on labor, which dictated that the labor contract was nothing more 
than an exchange of labor and money without any further obligations for either party. He began with 
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the modern labor contract, which also included the authority relationship. In the modern world, with 
its giant factories, steam driven machinery and complex railroad system, it was an illusion to think 
that the worker was not subordinated to the authority of his employer. In this labor relationship, the 
machine dictated the pace. Labor was divided and every worker had his specific task to fulfill. ‘The 
worker had become a soldier, what do I say, almost an automate’, Sainctelette claimed106. 
Sainctelette’s analysis was not surprising if one takes into consideration that he was a practicing 
lawyer with a good understanding of modern labor. It was, however, the opposite of contemporary 
legal thinking. Not surprisingly, Sainctelette criticized the lawyers, with their theoretical, outdated 
and conservative interpretation of labor relations, and especially the exegetic school, which he called 
‘la fâcheuse école du texte’107. The ‘exegists’ started from statutes as the primary source of law and 
they limited themselves to writing comprehensive commentaries on the Napoleonic codes, especially 
the civil code. In fact, Sainctelette was an early example of the so-called ‘École de la libre recherche 
scientifique’, with François Gény as its most important exponent108. 
 
The new theory of Sainctelette had limited success in some lower courts109. In 1886, the 
Cassation court had to take it into consideration in the industrial accident case of Jules Masy110. On 
13 November 1883, train conductor Masy, controlling tickets on the train from Manage to Mons, fell 
off the moving train and died. His relatives started a procedure against the Belgian state and claimed 
that the state had a contractual obligation to guarantee the safety of its employees during their duty. 
On 3 May 1884, the civil tribunal of Brussels rejected the claim because such an obligation was not 
mentioned in the civil code. On 7 August 1884, the Court of Appeal of Brussels confirmed the 
judgment. After this rejection, the relatives of Masy went to the Cassation court. Attorney-general 
Mestdach de ter Kiele claimed in his requisitory that they were first and foremost searching for a 
ruling principle regarding the new theory of Sainctelette111. The Cour de Cassation ruled that the 
obligation of ‘guarantee’ was not an essential element of the labor contract, since the civil code was 
mute on the subject. If the relatives of Masy wanted to receive compensation from the Belgian state, 
they had to prove that the state made a mistake, according to the rules of extra-contractual liability 
law. In other words, Sainctelette’s theory was rejected. 
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 The 1886 Labor Commission  
 
Nevertheless, Sainctelette had a second chance. The year 1886 was not only the year in 
which his theory was rejected by the judiciary, it was also a troublesome year in Belgian history: in 
the spring, the miners in the south of the country embarked upon strike because of the long lasting 
economic crisis112. This action was smashed down by the army which caused a lot of commotion in 
parliament and a Labor Commission was installed to study labor conditions113. In 1887, the industrial 
accidents were discussed and the parliamentary process of juridification of industrial accidents finally 
took off.  
 
In anticipation of the discussion in the Labor Commission, two members wrote a report 
describing the problem of industrial accidents and the solution in some western European 
countries114. Not by coincidence, Charles-Xavier Sainctelette was one of them. He even added a bill to 
convert his new theory into law. Surprisingly, during the discussions, his proposal was rejected 
because the solution offered was incomplete. Even with a shift of burden of proof, workers or their 
relatives still had to go through court to receive compensation for the damages caused by an 
industrial accident. This not only meant that the number of industrial accident trials would increase – 
with more conflicts between employers and employees – but also that not all workers would be 
helped115. Also, in many cases, the workers or their relatives would have to wait a long time to 
receive compensation, as the trials often took much time. For these reasons, the assembly favored 
the solution offered by the second reporter, Charles Dejace, a professor of political economy from 
the University of Liege. He proposed to introduce a system of insurances. This way, all workers would 
be helped without having to go to court. This was the solution that was finally adopted in the 
conclusions of the labor commission116. 
 
 Towards the 1903 Industrial Accident Insurance Act 
 
Surprisingly enough, it would take sixteen long years before the Industrial Accident Insurance 
Act would be voted by the Belgian parliament. There are a number of explanations for this delay. To 
start with, the Labor Commission only gave recommendations. Moreover, not everybody in the Labor 
Commission was convinced that insurance was the best system to solve the industrial accident 
problem. I have already mentioned Sainctelette, but he was not the only skeptic on insurance being 
the best solution for the industrial accident problem. Eudore Pirmez for example, the president of 
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the Labor Commission, also thought industrial accident disputes had to be solved using traditional, 
although slightly adapted, civil law. That is why the industrial accident problem was referred to the 
commission for the reform of the civil code117. In 1888, Pirmez developed a new theory, which was 
very similar to the theory of Sainctelette, but he spoke of a legal obligation of warranty instead of a 
contractual obligation118. The purpose was the same: to make it easier for the laborers to deliver the 
necessary proof in court. In the session of the civil code reform commission on 23 March 1889, the 
industrial accident problem was discussed. The commission decided this matter needed to be solved 
outside the civil code119. The parliamentary rollercoaster regarding industrial accidents really took off 
on 17 May 1890 with a proposal from four members of parliament120. Three other proposals would 
follow, whereof the first two would fail and only the third and last one would lead to the 1903 
Industrial Accident Insurance Act121. 
 
The question remains why did it take so long? In the first years after the Labor Commission, 
the political minds were just not ready to take such a drastic step. The dominant ideology was still 
liberal. I have already pointed at Sainctelette and Pirmez, who were willing to alter the existing 
liability rules a little, but they did not want to introduce a generalized system of insurance because 
their mental framework was still liberal. The same can be said about the first ‘social’ legislation, 
which in fact was clearly liberal122. In his Ph. D. dissertation about the development of social 
legislation in Belgium, Jo Deferme explained this development as a gradual evolution from ‘atomism’ 
to ‘holism’ with a slow, but increasing acceptance of state intervention in the individual labor 
relationships123. During the discussions in the Labor Commission, Sainctelette already stated that the 
proposal for a general insurance was necessary, but ultimately unrealistic (‘utopie’)124. As an 
experienced politician, he realized that the Belgian parliament at that moment would never vote in 
favor of such a radical proposal. Many years later, in 1899, Charles Dejace, his opponent in the Labor 
Commission, would admit: ‘Le problème était trop neuf, il paraissait trop vaste et trop difficile à 
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résoudre pour occuper utilement l’activité d’un parlement qui faisait ses premiers pas dans la voie de 
la législation sociale’125.  
 
In the testimony of Dejace, one can read that its complexity was a second explanation why it 
took so long to introduce a general system of industrial accident compensation through insurance. At 
first sight, it looks simple: just introduce a general system of insurance and the problem is solved. A 
closer look, however, reveals a great number of discussion points, some of them small, others 
fundamental. It would take us too long to discuss them all in detail, but a number of examples can 
illustrate my point. Deciding which laborers were to be included in the new system necessitated a 
difficult delimitation of the concept ‘laborer’, through a definition of the labor contract. Not by 
coincidence, the second parliamentary proposal discussed both the labor contract and industrial 
accident insurance126. Finally, the discussion regarding the labor contract would be solved with two 
acts from 1896 and 1900127. Another point of discussion was which industrial ‘accidents’ were to be 
compensated. Between the systems of fault liability and objective liability, there was a whole 
spectrum with possible nuances. After all, the concept of professional risk (‘risque professionnel’) 
could have been interpreted broadly or narrowly128. One specific discussion point was if gross 
negligence (‘faute lourde’) had to be covered. In 1897, this specific question was even submitted to 
the international conference of industrial accidents in Brussels for discussion by the international 
assembly129. Other discussion points that had to be solved concerned the procedure (which tribunal 
is competent to solve this matter?), the amount of the damages awarded, the organization of the 
system (by the state or by private actors?), etc. Not surprisingly, over 200 amendments were 
submitted and it took parliament over a month to discuss all aspects of the new legislation until it 
was finally voted on Christmas Eve 1903, which was an early Christmas present for the Belgian 
victims of industrial accidents130. 
 
‘Bürokratisierung131’ 
 
During the long parliamentary process that would result in the 1903 Act, the world outside 
the parliament changed. Half a century after the recommendations of Mareska and Heyman, in 1894, 
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labor regulation and inspection finally saw the light. This event can be contextualized in the larger 
process of juridification of the administration (‘Bürokratisierung’). I already discussed the decisive 
role of the different specialized administrations in the juridification of mining, railroad and steam 
engine disasters and the failed efforts of the ministers of the interior to expand inspection and 
regulation for certain categories of dangerous, unhealthy or polluting factories. The 1886 Labor 
Commission would here too turn out to be a catalyst, in two ways. 
 
Firstly, the recommendations of the Labor Commission resulted in a number of acts 
promulgating protective measures for the laborers, such as wage protection132 and woman and child 
labor regulation through minimal age rules, limited working hours and a prohibition of night labor133. 
In order to be able to enforce this regulation, the legislator foresaw in measures to appoint officials 
to monitor the work floor134. These officials were appointed in 1891135 and had free access to the 
factories, could ask for the ‘livret’ (a kind of workers’ passport) and report any violations on the 
regulation136.  
 
Secondly, the findings of the 1886 Labor Commission also led to a next step in the regulation 
of the dangerous, unhealthy or polluting factories. On 27 December 1886 a new Royal Decree 
adjusted the one of 29 January 1863137. An industrialist who wanted to build a new polluting factory 
had to report which measures he would take to limit the dangers for his laborers. In 1887 a new 
categorization was introduced with a special category for factories whose laborers were subjected to 
increased dangers138. These factories were subjected to more severe regulations and supervision. 
The most important step however, was taken in 1888, when a new act regulated the inspection of 
dangerous, unhealthy or polluting factories139. The inspectors had free access to the factories and 
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they had to draw reports of specific infractions140. In reality however, the officials did not have the 
man power to begin inspecting141. 
 
Despite all these new regulatory efforts, the general inspection of the world of labor 
remained nonexistent. This changed on 21 September 1894, when a number of important Royal 
Decrees were promulgated. For the first time, specific labor inspectors were appointed to inspect the 
factories to see whether they complied with the different labor regulations142. Moreover, a 
regulation was issued to ensure the hygiene of the work place and to protect the laborers against 
industrial accidents143. Interestingly enough, many of these regulations were just copied from earlier 
examples in the admission procedure144. This time, however, they had a generally binding character, 
not only for newly established factories, but also for existing ones. 
 
If one puts these evolutions into the larger picture, one could define them as a further 
colonization of the world of industry by the state (‘Bürokratisierung’). During most of the nineteenth 
century, this state intrusion was limited to dangerous, capital intensive sectors such as mines and 
railroads. Efforts to push forward in other sectors were effectively blocked by the industrialists. By 
the end of the century, the government finally succeeded in imposing regulation and inspection, by 
combining the tools it received through the early social legislation (a result of an early 
‘Parlementarisierung’) with the already existing regulation in the dangerous, unhealthy or polluting 
factories (earlier ‘Bürokratisierung’). 
 
The 1894 regulation started a new era. For the first time in Belgian history, specialized labor 
inspectors started visiting the collective of classified factories. They registered many kinds of 
industrial accidents and wrote extensive reports, which allowed the competent minister in Brussels 
to understand the problem. This began a very dynamic period, resulting in new, improved regulation 
and the publication of many statistics145.  
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Despite the progress, two problems remained. The industrialists continued to fight fiercely 
against the state intrusion, which irritated them. They argued that the new regulation did not have a 
solid legal base: it was only issued by the administration which – according to them – did not have 
the competence to do so. Another problem was the often arbitrary line between classified and non-
classified factories. In a number of cases it was not clear whether a company fell under the classified 
regulation or not. Also, the labor inspectors soon noticed that the classified, often larger factories 
actually did a good job in putting the new rules into practice. The worst labor conditions could be 
found in the smaller factories, which were in most cases not covered by the regulation of the 
dangerous, unhealthy or polluting factories. 
 
In order to deal with these two problems, on 23 November 1898, minister of labor Nyssens 
laid down a new proposal in parliament. It resulted in the Act of 2 July 1899, which expanded the 
existing safety regulation on the non-classified factories146. Interesting enough, the proposal did not 
meet any opposition in the parliament. As I have shown above, the mentality of the members of 
parliament changed. Moreover, this expansion was a logical next step in the ongoing colonization of 
the world of labor147. 
 
‘Justizialisierung’ 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century, juridification of industrial accidents could not only be 
detected in the parliament and administrations, but also (still) in the case law. To illustrate this, I 
refer to the graph below, on which the number of industrial accident cases published in two 
important reviews, Pasicrisie and La Belgique Judiciaire, is represented148. After a few isolated cases 
in the 1850’s, 1860’s, and 1870’s one sees the number of industrial accident trials following mining, 
railroad or steam engine disasters, as discussed above. A second peak is situated in the middle of the 
1880’s, which can be explained by the reaction to Sainctelette’s new theory in case law. In the 1890’s 
every year a substantial number of judgments involving industrial accidents were published. The 
explanation for this considerable number is simple: more and more laborers or their relatives started 
a judicial procedure to receive compensation for the damage they suffered as a result of an industrial 
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accident. The majority of these cases were extra-contractual liability cases; in a limited number of 
cases, the discussion involved industrial accident insurance contracts149. 
 
 
 
 
The rejection of Sainctelette’s new theory did not mean the end of industrial accident 
procedures in Belgium, on the contrary. The rising number of industrial accident cases showed the 
necessity to find a structural solution for the many victims of such an event, who all too often failed 
to receive compensation. It also increased the pressure on the employers to find a satisfactory 
solution. After all, when condemned by a tribunal or court, the expenses could be costly. Even in the 
many cases the employer won, he lost a lot of money due to the lawyer and procedural costs. The 
1903 Act offered them many advantages from this perspective: the industrial accident cases ceased 
to exist, because of the so-called immunity the 1903 Act gave them150. Also, the industrial accident 
cost could be precisely calculated, as this was the cost of the premium.  
 
The most important consequence of the rising number of industrial accident cases in the 
years preceding the 1903 Industrial Accident Act, however, was the development of a new branch of 
extra-contractual liability law, which was reflected in the jurisprudence. To start with, many cases 
were being published in various juridical reviews, as the graph above shows. In 1898, a specialized 
review, the ‘Revue des question de droit industriel’, from 1903 on called the ‘Revue des accidents du 
travail et des questions de droit industriel’ even saw the future. In this review, case law and articles 
regarding aspects of industrial accident discussions were being published. As shown above, the first 
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industrial accident cases also inspired lawyers such as Sainctelette and Pirmez to develop new 
theories. Of course the jurisprudence did not limit itself to reproducing case law: it also discussed the 
parliamentary evolutions and the developments abroad. After all, at the end of the nineteenth 
century, industrial accidents were an international phenomenon, as the international conferences 
illustrate. Again, a graph can illustrate this development of the jurisprudence.  
 
In 1895, Léon Losseau published a bibliography of published industrial accident 
compensation jurisprudence. Originally, this bibliography was intended as an appendix of a industrial 
accident study, but due to its large size, Losseau decided to publish it separately. The bibliography 
only contained jurisprudence regarding the compensation of industrial accidents and was published 
only in French. Case law was not included, as this was already the topic of other repertories. Despite 
these limitations, his bibliography was gigantic, with no less than 1357 topics.  
 
 
 
The graph shows a clear and continuous increase of the number of doctrinal contributions, 
really taking off from the mid 1870’s and especially 1880’s. It reflects the boom of industrial accident 
contributions in the jurisprudence.  
 
In conclusion 
 
In this article, I have sketched the complex process of juridification of industrial accidents in 
nineteenth century Belgium. My research model helped to distinguish between different forms of 
juridification. These semi-autonomous social fields of juridification have on the one hand an 
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autonomous evolution and on the other a continuous, increasing mutual interference. Both the study 
of the autonomous evolutions and the mutual influences are necessary to fully grasp what 
happened. Underlying are a number of sub-processes of juridification that will have to be studied 
more thoroughly in the future. The influence of ‘Bürokratisierung’ upon ‘Justizialisierung’ for example 
can explain why some specific accidents were brought before the courts earlier than others. From an 
international perspective, a comparison of the processes of juridification can shed new light upon the 
diverging evolutions of industrial accidents in the various European countries. Moreover, the general 
principles of juridification can be applied upon many other evolutions in legal history.  
 
 
Summary:  
 
A study on juridification. The case of industrial accidents in nineteenth century Belgium. 
 
Juridification is a complex and ambiguous concept, which legal history can help to understand. In the 
article, the transitions regarding industrial accidents in nineteenth century Belgium are discussed as 
processes of juridification. It shows the necessity to distinguish between several semi-autonomous 
social fields of juridification (administration, parliament, justice), each of which is characterized by 
autonomous evolutions and mutual interferences.  
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